SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ANTITRUST

SURVEY
LAW-FRANCHISING-APPLICATION

OF THE "RULE

OF REASON" TO CHALLENGED RESTRAINTS OF

TRADE-State v.

Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980).
Lawn King, Inc., a New Jersey corporation, was organized in
accordance with the Franchise Practices Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:10-1 to -15 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), for the purpose of providing lawn care to individual customers through a distribution network of dealers and distributors. 84 N.J. at 184, 417 A.2d at 1028.
Under a Distributor Franchise Agreement, Lawn King distributors
paid $10,000 for a renewable five year franchise territory which afforded them the exclusive right to sell Lawn King dealerships within
their franchised region. Id. at 187, 417 A.2d at 1029. As compensation for their services, Lawn King distributors received $750 for each
new franchise established in their territory, 2.5% of the dealers'
weekly revenues, and a 20% markup on seeds and chemicals sold to
the dealers. Id.
Similarly, the Lawn King Dealers Franchise Agreement called
for payment of a $12,500 franchise fee and the purchase of Lawn King
approved gardening equipment and materials. Id. at 186, 417 A.2d at
1029. Dealers were required to pay Lawn King 10% of all weekly
revenues and to participate in cooperative advertising ventures with
other Lawn King franchisees. In return, Lawn King, Inc. would lend
the dealers certain machinery, permit the dealers to use the Lawn
King logo, and provide for training and continuing education. Lawn
King, Inc. retained a right of first refusal over any dealer's decision to
sell or transfer his franchise. Id.
On June 15, 1973, a state grand jury indicted Lawn King and
Joseph Sandler, its president and majority stockholder, charging several restraints of trade in violation of section 3 of the State Antitrust
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). 84 N.J.
at 187, 417 A.2d at 1029.
The trial court, in an opinion reported at 150 N.J. Super. 204,
375 A.2d 295 (Law Div. 1977), followed United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), and held that the "per se rule"
controlled the antitrust issues in the case. Applying the per se
analysis, the trial court found both defendants guilty of five violations
of the State Antitrust Act: (1) price-fixing, dictating set prices which
Lawn King dealers must charge for their services; (2) territorial restrictions, limiting Lawn King dealer's sales of goods or services
within their designated franchise area; (3) illegal tying arrangements
perpetuated by requiring dealers to purchase seeds and chemicals
from Lawn King distributors or from other "approved sources"; (4)
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forced compliance with cooperative advertising ventures; and (5) unjust retainer of a right of first refusal over dealers who wish to sell
their franchises. 84 N.J. at 188, 417 A.2d at 1030. The court found
defendants not guilty of all other charges. Id. In a separate opinion,
152 N.J. Super. 333, 377 A.2d 1214 (Law Div. 1977), defendant
Lawn King was fined a total of $120,000 while defendant Sandier was
sentenced to six months in prison and fined $43,120. 84 N.J. at 188,
417 A.2d at 1030.
The appellate division, 169 N.J. Super. 346, 404 A.2d 1215 (App.
Div. 1979), reversed after determining that the correct standard to be
applied in this situation is the "rule of reason." Unlike the per se
rule which finds liability upon a prima facie showing of certain business practices, the rule of reason requires judges to examine the
reasonableness of the challenged restraints. 84 N.J. at 189, 417 A.2d
at 1030.
After finding no evidence to justify charges of price fixing, illegal
tie-in requirements, or horizontal trade restraints, the appellate division examined the reasonableness of the right of first refusal and the
cooperative advertising practices and concluded that Lawn King had
not violated any provisions of the New Jersey Antitrust Act. Id. at
189, 417 A.2d at 1031.
The supreme court granted certification in order to resolve the
conflicting standards of review applied by the trial court and the appellate division. Id. at 190, 417 A.2d at 1031. Noting that Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), had overruled
the Schwinn case, the supreme court affirmed the appellate division's
application of the rule of reason. The court then re-examined Lawn
King's practices in light of their effect on interbrand competition and
found that Lawn King's territorial restrictions did not prevent other
lawn care companies from competing for a share of the gardening
business. 84 N.J. at 194-95, 417 A.2d at 1033-34. The cooperative
advertising requirements and the franchisor's retainer of a right of
first refusal were also upheld as reasonable business procedures which
the franchisor could enforce in order to protect the corporate name
and the quality of the franchisees. Id. at 196-97, 417 A.2d at 1034-35.
Like the appellate division, the supreme court found no evidence
that the dealers and distributors had conspired to "horizontally" fix
prices in restraint of trade. Id. at 207, 417 A.2d at 1040. In fact, the
court found Lawn King's practice of advising dealers to charge "recommended" prices to be a tolerable pricing strategy in accordance
with the renowned "Colgate doctrine" set forth in United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 84 N.J. at 201, 417 A.2d at
1037.
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The criminal nature. of the instant proceeding coupled with the
judicial inexperience in antitrust litigation persuaded the justices to
affirm the appellate division's application of the rule of reason to the
product tying charges despite substantial authority confirming the per
se illegality of such trade practices. Id. at 210, 417 A.2d at 1042.
Under the reasonableness standard, Lawn King's requirements constraining franchisees' purchases of seeds and chemicals were found to
be justifiable controls over the end product. Id. at 212, 417 A.2d at
1043.
The court concluded its opinion by noting that additional reasons
for affirming the appellate division judgments of acquittal included
concern over the protracted length of the trial, as well as an avoidance of double jeopardy implications which would arise in the event
of a remand. Id. at 215, 417 A.2d at 1045.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Pashman emphasized the importance of the double jeopardy considerations and wrote that he would
explicitly "reject on constitutional grounds the state's argument that a
second trial is warranted." Id. at 217, 417 A.2d at 1046 (Pashman, J.,
concurring).
The supreme court's analysis of these common franchise practices
is commendable for its equitable rule of reason approach which affords franchisors the opportunity to justify challenged restraints of
trade. In light of the current proliferation of franchised goods and
services, the flexible standards of State v. Lawn King will permit
franchisors to exercise innovative managerial strategies without fear of
a harsh per se judicial scrutiny of their potentially defensible franchising tactics.
ATTORNEYS-LEGAL

ETHICS-ATTORNEY DISQUALIFIED FROM

REPRESENTING INTEREST IN NEW LITIGATION ADVERSE TO
SIMILAR INTEREST OF FORMER CLIENT-Reardon v. Marlayne,
Inc., 83 N.J. 460, 416 A.2d 852 (1980).

Margaret Reardon was injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by brake failure. She retained the legal services of
Gaccione, Pomaco, Patton & Beck to institute a products liability suit
against General Motors Corporation, and a brake repair shop which
serviced the vehicle. General Motors was represented, as they had
been in the past, by the firm of Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey. 83
N.J. at 466, 416 A.2d at 855.
John Patton, who played a "vital role" at the Gaccione firm in
the Reardon suit against General Motors, formerly had been an associate at the Carpenter firm. During his ten year employment at
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Carpenter, Patton was involved in the defense of over fifty products
liability cases for General Motors. Id.
Because of Patton's exposure to information concerning General
Motors while at that firm, Carpenter moved to have Patton disqualified from representing Mrs. Reardon in her suit against General
Motors. Although Patton admitted he had access to General Motors
files while at Carpenter, Patton stated that he was "denied access to
any secret or confidence . . . because of his status as an associate."
Id. at 467, 416 A.2d at 856. Moreover, he argued that any information he did possess would be available to any party through pretrial
discovery. Id. The trial court granted the motion to disqualify Patton
and his firm. 163 N.J. Super. 529, 395 A.2d 255 (Law Div. 1978).
The trial court perceived two critical issues in need of resolution
when a disqualification motion is made: first, whether the matters
presented by the case are "substantially related" to the matters that
the counsel was involved in for his former client; and secondly,
whether the attorney's role with respect to the earlier representation
was of a great enough magnitude to apply a presumption of disclosed
confidences. Id. at 537, 395 A.2d at 259. The trial judge answered
both issues in the affirmative, finding that Patton's role in two cases
extremely similar to the present matter was dispositive of the motion.
Id. at 537-41, 395 A.2d at 259-61.
After the appellate division affirmed the disqualification of Patton, the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Patton's leave to
appeal. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Clifford affirmed the
disqualification of the attorney and his firm. Utilizing this case as a
vehicle to formulate a consistent approach to such matters, the court
articulated a three step analysis for determining disqualification motions based upon representation of interests adverse to former clients.
83 N.J. at 474-75, 416 A.2d at 859-60. When such a motion is raised,
the proponent must now show: a prior attorney-client relationship; a
substantial relationship, whether real or as viewed by the public, of
the subject matter of the representation; and access to relevant confidences of the former client. Recognizing the inherent difficulty of
demonstrating the third element, the court stated that access need
not be proved by direct evidence. Instead, an irrebuttable presumption of exposure to such confidences arises where "substantially related matters are present." Id. at 473, 416 A.2d at 859.
Applying this test to the facts involving Patton, the court demonstrated the strictness of the prophylactic rules of attorney discipline
contained in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Patton's
most persuasive argument was that as an associate in a large firm he
was not in a position to share client confidences. He contended that
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there are different degrees of an attorney-client relationship which
should mitigate the irrebuttable presumption of access to confidences
when the matters are substantially related. Id. at 467, 416 A.2d at
856. The court, however, read DR 4-101, prohibiting the disclosure
of client confidences, and DR 9-101, cautioning the avoidance of
"'even the appearance of professional impropriety," in conjunction,
and ultimately concluded that "one's status is not necessarily related
to the exposure one has to the client's confidences. Labels such as
partner, associate, clerk, co-counsel should not control the outcome of
decisions in this sensitive area." Id. at 474, 416 A.2d at 860.
The Reardon decision firmly establishes an extremely strict precedent disqualifying an attorney, as well as the members of his law
firm, from representing an interest in new litigation adverse to the
same or substantially similar interest of his former client. Thus, Reardon reinforces the position of the New Jersey courts that public policy mandates that the courts "ferret out and discourage unethical behavior" by members of the bar. Id. at 477, 416 A.2d at 861.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL

PROTECTION-

RESIDENCY

RE-

QUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDATES SEEKING OFFICE IN COMMISSION

FORM MUNICIPALITIES UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Matthews

v. At-

lantic City, 84 N.J. 153, 417 A.2d 1011 (1980).
In late 1979, Michael Matthews became a resident of Atlantic
City and on December 31 registered to vote in that municipality. The
following April, he submitted to the city a "petition for nomination"
for the office of city commissioner pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40:75-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), and at the same time filed suit
seeking to have N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:72-1 (West 1967) declared
unconstitutional. 84 N.J. at 156, 417 A.2d at 1013. That statute, also
known as the Walsh Act, pertained to commission forms of government and provided that in applicable municipalities, two-year residency was a requisite for those seeking office as a member of the
board of commissioners. Matthews contended that such a requirement violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in that it placed an impermissible burden on two "fundamental"
rights: the right to vote and the right to travel. Id. at 168, 417 A.2d
at 1019. The trial court rejected Matthews' challenge relying primarily on the case of Strothers v. Martini, 6 N.J. 560, 79 A.2d 857
(1951), in which the New Jersey supreme court upheld the statute
against a similar attack. The appellate division affirmed the lower
court's holding based on the same rationale. 84 N.J. at 157, 417 A.2d
at 1013.
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The New Jersey supreme court granted Matthews' petition for
certification agreeing that cases decided subsequent to Strothers had
lessened the applicability of that holding and had subjected legislation
affecting voters' rights to a more rigorous standard of constitutional
review. Writing for the court, Justice Pashman first examined the two
United States Supreme Court cases cited by Matthews in support of
his argument: Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). In Bullock, the Court found that a
Texas law requiring candidates in primary elections to pay filing fees
was violative of the equal protection clause because it tended to deter
low income individuals from running for office and therefore fell unequally on both voters and potential candidates of different economic
backgrounds. 84 N.J. at 159, 417 A.2d at 1014. The Dunn case involved a challenge to a Tennessee law which imposed on voters a
one-year state residency requirement and a three-month county residency requirement. The Court found that the law placed a direct
restriction on the "fundamental" rights of voting and travel, and, as
such, could only be upheld if necessary to promote a "compelling"
state interest. The Supreme Court discovered that no such interest
existed and struck down the law as unconstitutional. Id. at 159, 417
A.2d at 1015.
Matthews attempted to persuade the New Jersey supreme court
that these cases supported the proposition that a "strict" level of
scrutiny should be used by the court in evaluating the constitutionality of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:72-1 (West 1967). The strict
scrutiny approach as articulated by the Court in Dunn presumes the
challenged law to be unconstitutional unless it is determined necessary to further a compelling state objective. Justice Pashman rejected
Matthews' argument finding these United States Supreme Court
cases not to be controlling since they did not specifically address the
issue of residency as a condition for candidacy. Id. at 162, 417 A.2d at
1016. Instead, the court relied on other Supreme Court decisions and
concluded that in determining the appropriate standard of review in
this case, an examination had to be made of the individual rights
protected and those infringed upon. It was found that the purpose of
section 40:72-1 was to protect the integrity of the ballot. By requiring
residency, the candidate would have a better opportunity to
familiarize himself with local affairs and the voter would have greater
exposure to the candidate. On the other hand, the law infringed upon
the fundamental right to vote in that it limited the number of potential candidates. Id. at 170, 417 A.2d at 1020.
The court decided that while this statute was not unconstitutional
on its face since it only imposed an "indirect" limitation on voting
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rights, it did place a sufficient burden to necessitate an "intermediate" level of scrutiny. The standard of review under this approach requires that the statutory classification be "substantially related" to the achievement of an important government objective.
Furthermore, "intermediate" scrutiny places the burden of proving
this correlation on the state. In Matthews, therefore, the state had to
justify why a Walsh Act municipality should be treated exceptionally
with respect to candidacy requirements. Id. at 173, 417 A.2d at 1022.
The court determined that the state failed to establish this connection. There was no evidence to indicate that Walsh Act communities
possessed special characteristics which would justify why this form of
local government and others should be treated differently. Moreover,
the court found that "[a]s a class, Walsh Act municipalities do not
differ from others in terms of their size, location or geography." Id.
While the court did not rule that a two-year residency requirement
for candidates seeking local office was per se unconstitutional, it did
determine that since the right to vote was indirectly impaired by such
a law, the state would have to establish a strong justification, particularly where such a requirement was only imposed upon some communities and not upon others. Id. Because in Matthews, the state
failed to meet that burden of proof, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:72-1 was
found to be a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment. As a result, since Michael Matthews passed the local
forty-day residency requirement, he was "entitled to have his name
place on the ballot for election of the office of city commissioner." Id.
at 174, 417 A.2d at 1022.
CONSTITUTIONAL
"DEPARTMENT

STITUTIONALLY

LAW-SEPARATION

OF

OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE ACT OF

POWERS-

1974"

CON-

VALID-Township of Mount Laurel v. Depart-

ment of the Public Advocate, 83 N.J. 522, 416 A.2d 886 (1980).
The Township of Mount Laurel and two resident taxpayers commenced an action contending that the Department of the Public Advocate Act of 1974, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-1 to -47 (West Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981), violated the New Jersey Constitution. The suit followed the landmark case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount Laurel I) in
which the court held that a developing municipality may not constitutionally zone to exclude low and moderate income housing.
The Township passed an amended ordinance based on the provisions of Mount Laurel I, but the Public Advocate, on behalf of the
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NAACP chapter, sued the municipality, contending that the new ordinance was still unconstitutional. The trial court, however, substantially upheld the new municipal ordinance. Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 161 N.J. Super. 318,
391 A.2d 935 (Law Div. 1978). In addition, the Department of the
Public Advocate represented Mount Laurel on its appeal to the
United States Supreme Court. The Township, contending that this
was a conflict of interest, requested that it be afforded outside counsel,
which the Public Advocate declined to provide. When certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), Mount Laurel
requested reimbursement for its legal expenses, which the Public
Advocate also denied. 83 N.J. at 526-27, 416 A.2d at 888. In response, Mount Laurel filed an appeal from this administrative decision and challenged the constitutionality of the act creating the Public
Advocate.
The plaintiffs' attack on the power of the Public Advocate to act
upon what is ascertained to be the "public interest" was based on the
separation of powers clause of the New Jersey Constitution, article 3,
paragraph 1. Plaintiffs contended that the legislature in creating the
Department had "abdicated its power to determine what is in the
public interest." Id. at 530, 416 A.2d at 890. Maintaining that only
the legislature and the judiciary possess this power, the plaintiffs asserted that the Public Advocate, as part of the executive branch of
state government, may not be vested with such power. Id. The plaintiffs further contended that, contrary to the New Jersey Constitution,
the Public Advocate was spending public monies for private purposes.
Id. at 534, 416 A.2d at 892.
The trial court dismissed these claims, and the Supreme Court of
New Jersey ordered direct certification of the appeal. Id. at 527, 416
A.2d at 888. The court, speaking through Justice Clifford, addressed
the first argument by criticizing inflexible classifications of the powers
of government as impractical and destructive of those powers the
branches already possessed. Id. at 530, 416 A.2d at 890. Justice Clifford emphasized that the Public Advocate performs the function for
which the separation of powers clause was created-to guarantee a
system of checks and balances. Furthermore, he stated that the Public Advocate merely evaluates public policy and seeks to enforce the
public interest. The law is still made by the legislature and interpreted by the judiciary. Id. at 531, 416 A.2d at 891. Additionally, the
court noted that the guidelines in the statute and administrative regulations were sufficiently precise to preclude an unconstitutional delegation of powers. Therefore, there was no abdication of political responsibility by the legislature, and the availability of judicial review
precluded arbitrary action. Id. at 533, 416 A.2d at 892.
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The court also rejected the plaintiffs' second contention, that the
Public Advocate utilized monies from the public funds for private
purposes. Since "the public purpose" is inherently a broad concept,
merely because a private party benefited did not render such expenditure unconstitutional. Id. at 534, 416 A.2d at 892. Justice Clifford
concluded that the enforcement of the Mount Laurel I decision
clearly was for the good of many people and hence was for a public
purpose. Id. at 535, 416 A.2d at 893.
Not only did the court find that the Department of the Public
Advocate Act of 1974 was constitutional, but the court lauded it as an
exemplar of governmental commitment to the interests of the public.
By affording legal representation to the poor and powerless, the Public Advocate serves an essential need in our legal system. Id. at 53536, 416 A.2d at 893.
COUNTIES-BUDGETS-COUNTY

BUDGETS REQUIRED TO FALL

WITHIN CAP LAW LIMITS DESPITE INCREASES IN STATE MAN-

v. Degnan, 83 N.J. 393, 416 A.2d
816 (1980); In re Local Finance Board, 83 N.J. 389, 416 A.2d 814
(1980).
DATED EXPENDITURES-Clark

There are several state mandated expenditures which are imposed upon counties and which must be included in county budgets.
Among these expenditures are: maintenance of mentally ill and retarded patients cared for in state institutions, welfare assistance to
families with dependent children, financial aid to the disabled and the
aged, administrative costs of various welfare programs, and judicial
services. Clark v. Degnan, 83 N.J. at 397, 416 A.2d at 818. In 1978,
the County of Hudson feared that, because of the increased demands
of these expenditures, its budget would exceed the limitations imposed by the county "Cap" statute. Id. at 396, 416 A.2d at 817. The
county Cap Law prohibits a county from increasing its tax levy or
final appropriations in excess of 5% of the previous year's total. N.J.
STAT. ANN.

§§

40A:4-45.2 to -45.4 (West 1980).

In Clark v. Degnan, the County of Hudson brought an action
seeking a ruling which would prohibit the state agencies and the
judiciary from increasing expenditures by more than 5% over that of
the previous year. During the course of that action, fifteen other
counties joined the proceeding as intervenors on behalf of the plaintiffs, Board of Chosen Freeholders, County Executive, and County
Comptroller of Hudson County. The defendants in the suit included
the Attorney General, the Director of the Division of Local Government, the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, the
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State Administrative Director of the Courts, and the Trial Court Administrator of Hudson County. 83 N.J. at 396, 416 A.2d at 817. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, Hudson County, as well as the
fifteen intervening counties, passed budgets within the limits of the
Cap Laws and had those budgets accepted by the Director of the
Division of Local Government. The trial court, however, declared
that the issue was not moot and proceeded to hear the case. In the
trial court proceeding, cross-motions for summary judgment were
made and the action was dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed and the
defendants cross-appealed. The supreme court granted direct certification upon the plaintiff's motion. Id.
In a companion case, In re Local Finance Board, 83 N.J. 389,
416 A.2d 814 (1980), the Passaic County Board of Chosen Freeholders sought to have a decision of the Local Finance Board disapproving the 1979 Passaic County budget overturned. Id. at 391, 416 A.2d
at 815. The county, facing decreased revenues and increased expenses, had attempted to reduce expenditures for judicial services.
After a hearing at which the county was required to appear and justify reductions in the judiciary funding, the assignment judge entered
a court order which required the freedholders to fund the judiciary in
the amount authorized for the previous year. Pursuant to that order,
the county submitted a proposed budget to the Director of Local
Government Services which exceeded the 5% allowable Cap limit because of the increase in judicial expenditures. Id.
The Director disapproved the budget because monies for the
judiciary are required to be raised within the budget cap; the Local
Finance Board affirmed this disapproval. The county appealed this
decision to the appellate division and the supreme court certified the
matter on its own motion. Id.
Justice Schreiber, writing for the Clark court, affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. In dealing with
the mootness issue the court held that, despite the passing of the
counties' budgets, a bona fide dispute existed, especially since the
Cap Law remains in effect. 83 N.J. at 397, 416 A.2d at 818. In regard
to the main issue of whether state agencies and the judiciary should
be prohibited from increasing expenditures by more than 5% over
that of the previous year, the court could not find language within the
statute to interpret the Cap Law as applying to state agencies and the
judiciary. Id. at 400, 416 A.2d at 819.
The plaintiffs argued that by allowing increases in state mandated
expenditures to exceed the 5% limit, the purposes of the Cap Law
were not being fulfilled. The plaintiffs contended that the Cap Law
was intended to control the rising costs of municipalities as well as to
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provide essential services to the citizens. The Clark court, however,
rejected the plaintiffs' argument because it believed that the same
legislature which created the Cap Law should have the power to reject or modify that law. Id. at 399, 416 A.2d at 819. Even though the
court recognized the counties' dilemma of having to provide county
services and control the county tax levy while being faced with increased costs of programs, the court clearly articulated that the remedy lies with the legislature, not with the courts. Id. at 400, 416 A.2d
at 820.
The supreme court did modify the trial court's decision by disagreeing with its position that the exceptions to the Cap Law included
expenditures required after the effective date of the Cap Law by judicial decisions and administrative regulations as well as by federal
and state statutes. Justice Schreiber refuted this interpretation of the
statute because the court believed that exceptions to the Cap Law
were intended only for new services or activities so that local governments would not have to cut funds to existing programs in order to
provide monies for new activities. Id. at 401, 416 A.2d at 820.
In the companion case of Local Finance Board, the supreme
court relied on the Clark opinion by affirming the Local Finance
Board's disapproval of the proposed budget. The court rejected the
plaintiff's reliance on the trial court's opinion in Clark v. Degnan, 163
N.J. Super. 344, 394 A.2d 914 (Law Div. 1978) which held that the
Cap Law exceptions included "all expenditures mandated after August 18, 1976, pursuant to court orders." Rather, the court applied its
opinion in Clark, which held that expenditures of the same type
which existed before the County Cap Law and did not involve a new
service or activity were to be included in the 5% limitation. 83 N.J.
at 392, 416 A.2d at 815. The court concluded that to hold otherwise
would be to have judicial expenditures included in Cap Law requirements where no disagreement arose and to have the same expenditures excluded where a court was compelled to issue an order.
Id.
As a result of Clark and Local Finance Board, it is clear that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey is calling on the legislature to modify
the County Cap Law. Although the court enforced the existing law, it
recognized the inequity of a system which allows state agencies and
the judiciary to increase a county's costs for programs without limit
while curbing the county's increase in expenditures to 5% over the
previous year's spending. Clearly, the court is of the opinion that
these inequities must be balanced.
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SEIZURE-

WARRANTLESS

SEARCHES OF ESTABLISHMENTS INVOLVED IN
LIQUOR INDUSTRY AUTHORIZED ONLY WHEN PURPOSE IS TO
ENFORCE ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE
CONTROL
LAWS AND

REGULATIONS-State v. Williams, 84 N.J. 217, 417 A.2d 1046

(1980).
On January 22, 1976, two Paterson Police Department detectives

entered Joyce's Bar in Paterson. Their purpose was to investigate information they had received two days earlier from an unidentified
source concerning a stolen CB radio. After identifying themselves to
the bartender, they undertook an extensive search of the premises.
The search was made without a warrant. In a small liquor storage
room in the basement the police discovered defendant Williams with
two companions. The room also contained gambling materials, a large
amount of money, two loaded revolvers, and a stolen CB radio. The
property was seized as evidence, and the men were arrested. 84 N.J.

at 221, 417 A.2d at 1048.
At the trial the defendants requested that the seized evidence be
suppressed. The trial judge denied this motion determining that N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 13:1-35 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) authorized the
warrantless search. The jury found Williams guilty of possession of
lottery paraphernalia, working for a lottery, and possession of a revolver without a permit. 84 N.J. at 221, 417 A.2d at 1048.
The appellate division reversed, interpreting this statute to authorize warrantless searches only if they specifically relate to the
enforcement of liquor laws and regulations. The appellate court found
that the seized evidence should have been suppressed on the grounds
that the search was not conducted specifically for that purpose. 168
N.J. Super. 359, 403 A.2d 31 (App. Div. 1979).
The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's decision. Justice Pollock, writing for the majority of the court, first disposed of the
issue of whether Williams had standing to assert the fourth amend-

ment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The state
claimed that Williams had no such standing because he was not the
owner of the searched premises. The court held that Williams was
entitled to raise the fourth amendment because he had a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" in the storage room. 84 N.J. at 221-22, 417
A.2d at 1048.
Considering the major issue of the validity of the warrantless
search, Justice Pollock noted that the liquor industry had historically
been subject to strict government regulation. He recognized that it is
not uncommon for the government to authorize warrantless searches
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of such closely regulated industries. The court, however, rejected the
notion that persons engaged in these businesses completely waive
their fourth amendment rights. Id. at 225, 417 A.2d at 1050. Had the
officers been expressly authorized to make a search relating to the
enforcement of liquor laws and regulations it would have been valid.
No evidence of such authorization was found. Id. at 226, 417 A.2d at
1050.
Nor did the court find that consent had been given to the search
either impliedly through the existence of the liquor license or expressly by the bartender. Although the license application specifically
provides for searches without a warrant by all officers, this is limited
by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-35 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). 84 N.J.
at 226-27, 417 A.2d at 1051.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Schreiber noted that the language of the New Jersey liquor statutes and the regulations promulgated thereunder unambiguously sanction warrantless searches of
businesses engaged in the distribution of liquor "by any officer." Id.
at 231, 417 A.2d at 1053 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice
Schreiber reasoned that not allowing the admissibility of evidence
seized in searches of this nature would be contrary to legislative intent. Id. at 233, 417 A.2d at 1055 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Although many other courts have held that persons doing business in such a sensitive industry as the liquor business waive their
fourth amendment rights, the opinion of this court is reflective of the
trend to ensure the rights of citizens engaged in such industries
against unreasonable search and seizure. In this manner it is possible
for a balance to emerge which provides some guarantee of fourth
amendment rights without weakening the strict government control
over these highly regulated industries.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-BOTH SPOUSES LIABLE FOR NECESSARY
EXPENSES INCURRED BY EITHER

SPOUSE-Jersey Shore Medical

Center v. Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980).
Following a long illness during which he was a patient at the
Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hospital, Sidney Baum died
leaving $25,709.50 in unpaid hospital and medical bills. Mr. Baum's
Medicaid benefits had been depleted, and his estate was insolvent,
leaving Mrs. Baum with only her home, worth $25,200, as an asset.
Mrs. Baum had not agreed to pay her husband's hospital expenses. 84
N.J. at 140, 417 A.2d at 1004. The hospital brought an action against
Mrs. Baum and her husband's estate for the unpaid balance. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Baum, and the hospital
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appealed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted direct certification and, in an opinion by Justice Pollock, affirmed the judgment for
Mrs. Baum. Id.
The hospital's primary contention was that the common law liability of a husband for his wife's necessary expenses, such as for a
terminal illness, should extend to create liability of the wife for her
husband's necessaries. The supreme court agreed that both spouses,
"as a financial unit," should be liable for the necessary expenses
incurred by either spouse, except that creditors must first look to the
spouse who incurred the debt for satisfaction. Finding insufficient resources, creditors may then require the other spouse to satisfy the
debt. Id. at 141, 417 A.2d at 1005. The court likened the modern
marriage to a partnership based on "the evolving interdependence of
married men and women" when confronted with necessary family expenses. Id. The court reasoned that the common law view that a
husband was liable for his wife's necessary expenses while she had no
comparable duty was developed during the period when wives exchanged their services and society for their husbands' support. Id.
Statutes have not modified the rights and duties of husband and wife
pertaining to necessary expenses; a husband is obligated to assume
payment of his wife's expenses. Id. at 142, 417 A.2d at 1005.
The supreme court refuted the hospital's second claim that the
expenses for a last illness should be treated like funeral expenses,
debts of the husband's estate for which the wife would be liable. The
court disagreed, stating that since expenses of a last illness occur before death, creditors have an opportunity to obtain payment from the
spouse incurring the expense. Id. at 143, 417 A.2d at 1006. The hospital contended finally that the Married Woman's Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 37:2-15 (West 1968), which states that a woman is not liable for
her husband's debts, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Noting that the
unequal treatment originated in the common law, the court concluded it was more appropriate to examine this body of law. Id.
The hospital cited Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), in which the
United States Supreme Court found that a statute providing for payment of alimony only by husbands was violative of the equal protection clause, to demonstrate that liability for debts should be extended
to wives. The Orr Court, stressing that the wife is no longer the
dependent spouse, "rejected the 'old notion' that the man is solely
responsible to provide a home and its essentials." 84 N.J. at 147, 417
A.2d at 1008. The Supreme Court of New Jersey utilized the same
reasoning in its decision to modify the common law rule to provide a
more equitable distribution of the cost of basic expenses which might
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be incurred by either spouse. Id. The court cited the financial contribution made by wives as significant; in 1977, both husband and
wife were wage earners in 48.8% of all families. Women have become
the primary source of income in some households, and under the
present rule, the dependent husband, not the wife, would be liable
for the necessary expenses of both spouses. Id.
While the common law rule is admittedly more favorable to the
needy wife who may earn less than her husband or who may not
work at all, the court found this "insufficient reason to retain a gender
based classification that denigrates the efforts of women who contribute to the finances of their families and denies equal protection to
husbands." Id. at 148, 417 A.2d at 1008. Some protection is afforded,
however, to the spouse who does not expressly agree to assume the
debt. Id. at 151, 417 A.2d at 1010. The court concluded that the
common law doctrine holding only the husband responsible for necessary expenses of both spouses constitutes a denial of equal protection
under the law, and it must adapt to women's "economic equality and
to the mutual sharing of all obligations by husbands and wives." Id. at
149, 417 A.2d at 1009. In this case, however, since Mrs. Baum had
properly relied on prior law, the court decided that it would be unjust to apply this rule retroactively and require Mrs. Baum to assume
her husband's debt. Id. at 151-52, 417 A.2d at 1010-11. Any debts
incurred after this case was decided, however, will be subject to the
non-gender based rule. Id. at 152, 417 A.2d at 1011.
The willingness of the court to perceive the modern marriage as
a "financial unit" will be welcomed by those seeking to define women's
roles in terms of their present importance in the family economic
structure. Id. at 149, 417 A.2d at 1009. Justice Pollock recognized
that just as services, whether domestic or income providing, benefit
the family unit, so do necessary expenditures, even if incurred by
only one spouse. In observing the trend of modern families to share
their financial responsibilities and perhaps to reduce the burden of
the traditional husband's role, the court provided a contemporary
model to which future families might aspire.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING
LATING

FIRST AMENDMENT

SIGN ORDINANCE VIO-

RIGHT TO POLITICAL EXPRESSION

RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL-State

v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 416

A.2d 821 (1980).
In August, 1976, defendant Donald L. Miller, who lived in a
house on a residentially zoned avenue in the Borough of Milltown,
placed a four by eight foot sign on his front lawn. The sign sardoni-
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cally welcomed prospective residents to the neighborhood by alerting
them to the fact that it was in a flood hazard area. The sign further
wished them luck and offered information. The borough's building
inspector brought a complaint against the defendant for failing to secure a permit for a sign exceeding six square feet as required under
the borough's zoning ordinance. The ordinance also restricted the
types of signs permitted in residential areas to a name or address
sign, a "for sale" or "for rent" sign, a sign naming firms working
there, a sign indicating future use, a sign placed by the government,
and identification signs for churches, schools, playgrounds, parks, and
public utility installations. The borough conceded that it would not
have granted a permit for defendant's sign since it was not in any
type allowed under the ordinance.
Ruling for the borough, the municipal court convicted the defendant. After a trial de novo in the Middlesex County Court reached
the same conclusion, the defendant appealed to the New Jersey
superior court which overturned the conviction. 162 N.J. Super. 333,
392 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1978). The court ruled that the ordinance
unconstitutionally violated the defendant's first amendment rights by
completely forbidding "political and public interest expression." Id. at
339, 392 A.2d at 1225. The borough appealed.
The state supreme court affirmed the superior court's decision.
83 N.J. at 417, 416 A.2d at 829. The supreme court first considered the legitimacy of the ordinance's primary purpose of preserving
aesthetic qualities of residential areas and consequently their property
values. Rejecting early state case law, the court approved the trend in
more recent state decisions which determined that municipal land use
law based on aesthetic considerations was a legitimate exercise of
police power. Id. at 407-08, 416 A.2d at 824. The problem in the
instant case, the court felt, was a conflict between aesthetic zoning
and free speech. Id. at 411-12, 416 A.2d at 825. According to the
court, the issue was free speech because the defendant's sign commented upon a public interest question and thus was a form of political expression to be accorded constitutional protection. Id. at 411,
416 A.2d at 825. The court drew an important distinction between
political speech and commercial speech, such as billboards, explaining
that the latter is provided less constitutional protection. But where a
law restricts political speech, it must pass certain constitutional tests
which have been delineated by the Supreme Court. First, the law
must be neutral toward the subject matter of the restricted speech.
Second, there must be a "significant government interest" upon
which it is based. Third, it must permit easy alternative means of
expressing the information. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
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ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (as
cited in 83 N.J. at 412, 416 A.2d at 826). Principally applying the
third test, the court concluded that sufficient alternative forms of
conveying the information were unavailable to defendant. Since the
sign was the easiest, cheapest, and most effective means of communicating his message, the court held that he should not be precluded from using it. The borough's interest in neighborhood aesthetic quality had to yield to the defendant's first amendment right.
Thus, the ordinance was ruled "unconstitutional on its face." 83 N.J.
at 414, 416 A.2d at 827.
Had the court ended its decision at that point, it may have left
considerable confusion over the constitutionally permitted bounds of
sign ordinances. Recognizing that potential problem, the court set out
guidelines within which municipalities can operate in constructing
their ordinances. A restrictive sign ordinance must be based upon
"compelling municipal interest," that interest must be expressed
in
the ordinance (for example, in the form of a specified goal or purpose), and the restrictions demonstrably must relate to that interest.
Id. at 414-17, 416 A.2d at 827-29. While the ordinance may treat
commercial and political speech differently, political speech may not
be prohibited from or restricted to any zone or area. Size restrictions
on the sign must be reasonable, so people on foot or in vehicles may
read it easily. The court suggested that a six square foot maximum,
which was specified in the instant ordinance, was most likely insufficient, though sixteen or eighteen square feet would pass muster. Finally, any other restrictions must be based on and relate to a "significant government interest." Id. at 416, 416 A.2d at 828.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-IN ACTION FOR
REPLEVIN OF A CHATTEL, "DISCOVERY RULE," NOT DOCTRINE
OF ADVERSE

POSSESSION,

DETERMINES WHEN CAUSE OF AC-

TION ACCRUED FOR PURPOSE OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-

O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
Georgia O'Keeffe, an artist, claimed that in March, 1946, three of
her paintings were stolen. 83 N.J. at 484, 416 A.2d at 865. She never
reported the theft to any law enforcement agency, nor to an insurance company because the paintings, only worth $150 at the time,
were not insured. Id. at 485, 416 A.2d at 865-66. O'Keeffe discussed
the theft with members of the art community, however, and also
mentioned it to the director of the Art Institute of Chicago. In 1972,
twenty-six ,,ears later, O'Keeffe agreed to report the theft to a newly
formed organization which registered stolen paintings. Prior to this
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she had refused to report the loss, believing such efforts would prove
futile. Id. at 485-86, 416 A.2d at 866.
In 1975, O'Keeffe discovered the paintings in a New York art
gallery. One year later she learned that Barry Snyder, a Princeton art
dealer, possessed the paintings which he had purchased in 1975 for
$35,000 without verifying ownership. Id. Ulrich Frank, the vendor,
acquired the paintings in 1965, but claimed continuous possession
through his father for over thirty years, a period beginning before the
alleged theft. Until the 1975 sale, the paintings were kept secluded in
Frank's residences with the exception of a one day art show in which
the paintings were exhibited anonymously. Id. at 486, 416 A.2d at
866.
When Snyder refused to return the paintings, O'Keeffe filed a
complaint claiming she was the true -owner. Snyder, who impleaded
Frank, claimed that the action was barred by N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:14-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) which provides that an action
for replevin must be commenced within six years of the accrual of the
cause of action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Snyder
on the grounds that the cause of action accrued the day of the theft,
and was therefore barred. The appellate division reversed, holding
that the statute of limitations was tolled because Snyder did not establish the elements of adverse possession. Id. at 483, 416 A.2d at
865. The New Jersey supreme court granted certification and reversed, remanding the case for trial to resolve several factual issues.
Id. at 484, 416 A.2d at 865.
Because the accrual of the cause of action serves as a point of
reference in the statute of limitations, the central issue was when the
cause of action had accrued. Adopting the "discovery rule" often used
in malpractice cases, the New Jersey supreme court held that "a
cause of action [does] not accrue until the injured party discovers, or
by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts which form the basis of the cause of action." Id. at 491,
416 A.2d at 869. In so holding, the court overruled the only New
Jersey cases dealing with the issue, Redmond v. New Jersey Historical
Society, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 28 A.2d 189 (E. & A. 1942) and Joseph v.
Lesnevich, 56 N.J. Super. 340, 153 A.2d 349 (App. Div. 1949), to the
extent that both held that the doctrine of adverse posssession applies
to chattels as well as to real property. 83 N.J. at 499, 416 A.2d at
873. The court noted, however, that although the doctrine of adverse
possession would no longer come into play, expiration of the statute
of limitations would still have the dual effect of cutting off the owner's
remedy, and vesting title in the possessor. Id. at 500, 416 A.2d at
874.
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In regard to the subsidiary issue of the effect of transfers under
the new rule, the majority held that subsequent transfers are not
separate acts of conversion which start the statute of limitations running anew, and that tacking should be allowed. Were it otherwise,
the purpose of the statute of limitations, namely to quiet titles and
protect against stale claims, would be undermined. Id. at 503, 416
A.2d at 875. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Handler claimed the
predominant view to be that each transaction represented a separate
act of conversion. Id. at 511, 416 A.2d at 880 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The court rejected the doctrine of adverse possession because of
the difficulties encountered in determining whether possession is
open, visible, and notorious. Furthermore, in the case of chattels,
open possession may not be sufficient to impart constructive notice to
the true owner since, unlike real property, chattels are easily transported. Id. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. The court used the discovery
rule to solve these problems and to inject equitable considerations
into the statute of limitations by shifting the emphasis from the conduct of the party in possession to that of the true owner. This shift in
emphasis, however, was accompanied by a shift in the burden of
proof. Id. at 497, 416 A.2d at 872. The majority believed the new
rule would offer greater protection to owners of stolen chattels and
discourage dealing in stolen art, while at the same time allowing the
statute of limitations to accomplish its purpose. Id. at 499, 416 A.2d
at 873. In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Handler stated
that the majority's holding was an artificial extension of the discovery
rule which would actually aid a thief in obtaining title. Rather than
focusing on the right to sue, he would have focused on the merits of
the case. Id. at 508, 416 A.2d at 878 (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice
Sullivan, although agreeing with the majority's legal analysis, also dissented because he did not agree with the majority's application of the
law to the facts. Id. at 507, 416 A.2d at 878 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
The O'Keeffe decision is significant in that it enables the owner of
a stolen chattel to preserve his right to repossession indefinitely, providing he is diligent in his efforts to retrieve and claim the chattel.
Although the burden of proof is shifted to the owner, when a chattel
is possessed adversely he no longer is in the difficult position of having to locate the property within six years, or lose title.
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SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-TRANSFER OF TENURED
TEACHERS OF' DISCONTINUED SCHOOL CONDITIONED

UPON

CONSENT OF DISTRICT RECEIVING TRANSFERRED PUPILS-In re

Closing of Jamesburg High School, 83 N.J. 540, 416 A.2d 896
(1980).
In April of 1979, the State Board of Education ordered the closing of Jamesburg High School pursuant to a finding of the Commissioner of Education that the school could no longer be operated in a
thorough and efficient manner. Those students who were Jamesburg
residents were transferred to Monroe Township High School, while
Helmetta residents were placed in the Spotswood school system. 83
N.J. at 544, 416 A.2d at 898. On May 1, 1979, the Commissioner
ordered the transfer of the tenured teaching staff of Jamesburg to the
receiving districts of Monroe and Spotswood, claiming authority for
the transfer in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-6.1 (West 1968). The statute
provides that whenever a board of education closes a school and "by
agreement with another board of education" reassigns its pupils to
that other district, the tenured teaching staff of the discontinued
school "shall be employed" by the receiving school. Id.
The Commissioner reasoned that the purpose of the statute was
to protect the employment rights of tenured teachers whenever two
districts entered into such a sending-receiving relationship. 83 N.J. at
544-45, 416 A.2d at 898. In upholding the Commissioner's order, the
State Board determined that despite the absence of express statutory
authority to order the transfer of teachers, public policy favored the
protection of the rights of tenured teachers. Both the Commissioner
and the State Board argued that the inclusion in the statute of the
phrase "by agreement" should not be so narrowly interpreted as to
undermine the manifest intent of the legislature to shield the tenure
system from the vicissitudes of the sending-receiving relationship. Id.
at 545, 416 A.2d at 898.
The Superior Court of New Jersey granted the applications by
Monroe and Spotswood to stay the decision of the State Board and,
on its own motion, consolidated and accelerated the appeals. 169 N.J.
Super. 328, 404 A.2d 1206 (App. Div. 1979). Reversing the determinations of the Commissioner and the State Board, the appellate division held that the Commissioner lacked both express and inherent
authority to compel the transfer of tenured teachers to the receiving
districts. According to the plain meaning of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A:28-6.1, such a transfer required the consent of the receiving district. 169 N.J. Super. at 333, 404 A.2d at 1208. Because the appellate
division decision would allow for the immediate dismissal of the
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Jamesburg teachers from the receiving schools, the supgeme court
stayed the judgment in order to maintain the status quo during the
1979-80 school year. In Jamesburg, the court dissolved the stay and
affirmed the appellate division, modifying the order to provide for a
limited remand to determine whether the receiving schools had discharged their own instructors in order to accommodate the Jamesburg
teachers under the invalid order. 83 N.J. at 551, 416 A.2d at 902.
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Clifford, construed
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-6.1 according to its plain meaning: that the
transfer of teachers is conditioned upon the consensual arrangement
between the sending and the receiving districts. 83 N.J. at 547, 416
A.2d at 899. The court found unpersuasive the appellants' argument
that the legislative intent to protect tenure rights should override the
clear and unambiguous terms of the statute. By framing the statute in
terms of a consensual arrangement, the legislature imposed a limitation on tenure protection. In this manner, the statute protects the
employment rights of the teachers of the receiving school as well as
those of the displaced teachers. Thus, not. only does the Commissioner lack express power to order the transfer of displaced teachers,
but that power belongs exclusively to the consenting receiving district. Id. at 547-48, 416 A.2d at 899-900.
The opinion also acknowledged that the Commissioner lacked the
inherent authority to order the transfer of tenured teachers. Id. at
548, 416 A.2d at 900. As an administrative officer, the Commissioner
can act only within the bounds of his delegated authority. Although
the Commissioner may have the jurisdictional authority to hear and
determine all controversies and disputes arising under school laws,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-9 (West 1968), that does not translate into
the power to fashion substantive law regarding tenure protection. 83
N.J. at 548, 416 A.2d at 900. Inasmuch as the power to transfer
pupils is an aspect of the constitutional duty to provide a thorough
and efficient education, it lies in the domain of the Commissioner.
On the other hand, the power to transfer tenured teachers arises
from the consideration of providing tenure protection and is controlled by the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-6.1. 83 N.J. at
549, 416 A.2d at 900-01.
In his dissent, Justice Sullivan found that the statute, although
correctly construed by the majority, simply did not control an order
issued by the Commissioner. Id. at 551-52, 416 A.2d at 902 (Sullivan,
J., dissenting). Chief Justice Wilentz, in a separate dissent, noted that
the statute prevented one district from imposing its pupils upon
another unless the two districts agreed to the transfer. Id. at 555, 416
A.2d at 904 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Wilentz found
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that the majority had subverted the legislative intent to protect tenure by conditioning the transfer of displaced teachers upon the consent of the receiving district. Id. at 553, 416 A.2d at 903 (Wilentz,
C.J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice noted that the majority decision will affect
every discontinuance of a school or grade in two ways. First, teachers
will face the loss of job security through no fault of their own. Second, it is unlikely that a receiving district would consent to the transfer of tenured teachers who are advanced on the pay scale, when by
withholding its consent it could fill the need for additional faculty
according to its own system of selection, negotiation and hiring. Id. at
553-54, 416 A.2d at 903 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting). In this light, the
decision to discontinue a school or grade may be perceived as a
weapon against tenured teachers. The majority ignored the legislative
and judicial tradition of extending the protection of tenure to many
instances of organizational and administrative change. Both dissenters, who were joined by Justice Pashman, viewed the protection of
teachers' tenure rights as an aspect of providing a thorough and efficient education. In limiting its analysis to the statute relied upon by
the Commissioner, the majority overestimated the significance of the
statute's consent clause as well as the absence of an express grant of
authority. Id. at 555, 416 A.2d at 904 (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting).
As a result of the Jamesburg decision, tenured teachers will be
denied faculty positions that have been created by the discontinuance
of their own school. The decision has spurred the introduction of a
bill in the State Legislature, S-1486, which if enacted would preserve, among other things, the tenure rights of displaced teachers,
whether the decision to discontinue the school results from an
agreement between two school boards or an administrative or judicial order.

